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R.E. Overill, M. Kwan, K.P. Chow, P. Lai and F. Law
Abstract Computers operate at discrete points in time and hence digital traces
are discrete events in temporal logic that reflect the occurrence of com-
puter processes. From the perspective of a digital investigation, it is
the duty of digital investigators or forensic examiners to retrieve digital
traces so as to prove or to refute the alleged computer acts. Given the
resource constraints of most organizations and the limited time-frame
available for the examination, it is not always feasible or indeed neces-
sary for forensic examiners to retrieve all the related digital traces and
to conduct a thorough digital forensic analysis. It is therefore the aim of
this paper to propose a model that can offer swift and practical digital
examination in a cost-effective manner.
Keywords: Bayesian Network, investigation Model, digital forensics
1. Introduction
Digital forensics involves the application of a series of processes on
digital evidence such as identification, preservation, analysis and pre-
sentation. In the analysis process, event reconstruction is an important
phase. It is in this phase that digital forensic examiners have to evalu-
ate the truthfulness of the forensics hypotheses of the crime or incident
according to the identified and retrieved digital traces [3, 7]. Stem-
ming from their inherent technological complexities, the identification
and retrieval of digital traces covers a wide range of techniques such as
cryptography, data carving, data reconstruction, etc. It is therefore rea-
sonable to expect that the retrieval of digital traces at different levels
of complexity will involve different levels of cost in terms of resources
required such as expertise, time, tools, etc.
2Fortunately, unlike physical events that are analogue and continuous,
digital events are discrete and occur in temporal sequence [1]. Therefore,
it is viable to determine the retrieval costs of individual digital traces.
However, in the lack of model for digital forensics investigation, most
digital forensics examiners tend to conduct a thorough retrieval of all
the related digital traces, despite being aware of the costs of retrieving
those digital traces.
We explain the aforementioned situation in a technical sense. Taking
an example of an investigation that comprises m digital traces there is
a total of m! permutations which represent all possible investigation
paths. Not all investigation paths are equally cost-effective however.
Typically, investigators may attempt to perform an exhaustive search
to identify all m traces or they may conduct a random search for the
traces.
However, since the investigation of different digital traces generally
requires different resources (e.g. time, tools, expertise, etc.) in different
amounts, the aforementioned approaches may be regarded as inefficient.
Additionally, the limited time-frame available for an investigation also
renders exhaustive search approaches impractical [2]. Consequently, in
situations where digital traces that carry significant evidential weights
could not be found, examiners would still endeavor to retrieve remaining
traces. Those remaining traces, however, are not sufficient to prove the
hypotheses, notwithstanding resources, which should have been deployed
to other forensic cases, are wasted.
Based on the retrieval costs of digital traces and by permutation analy-
sis, this paper aims to derive a cost-effective model to address the afore-
mentioned problem in digital forensics investigation.
2. The Proposed Model
Using the collective experience and judgment of digital forensic exam-
iners it is possible to rank the relative costs of investigating each of them
traces Ti. The relative costs can be estimated in terms of their resource
requirements (person-hours, access to specialist equipment, etc.) using
standard business accountancy procedures, prior to ranking. Without
loss of generality we can take the relative cost ranking to be: T1 ≤ T2 ≤
. . .≤Tm−1 ≤Tm. As a direct consequence of this ranking, the minimum
cost path for the overall investigation is immediately uniquely defined.
It is worth to denote here that different organizations can adopt different
relative costs to similar traces in order to meet with the organizational
goals.
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Figure 1. Example Path Diagram with 4 Traces
Our research focuses on digital traces on a hard disk. If the seized
computer has sufficient storage, all the digital traces can in principle
be preserved. If all the Ti (i=1. . .m) are preserved, the minimum cost
path is simply the permutation [T1T2 . . .Tm−1Tm]. Refer to the simple
(m=4) example path diagram 1. It may be of some general interest to
note here that the number of possible paths at each step is given by the
corresponding binomial coefficient of m. This is a direct consequence
of the isomorphism between the problem of selecting the next available
trace from an ordered permutation of m distinct traces, and the problem
of selecting the next object from a collection of m identical objects.
It is also valuable to acquire a prior indication as to whether the
overall investigation should be proceeded with. We estimate the eviden-
tial weight associated with the investigation as W=
∑m
i=1wi where the
relative fractional importance wi of each trace Ti is either assigned by
moderated independent expert peer review, or by default is set equal to
1/m. We note in passing that this process only needs to be undertaken
once as a pre-processing step for each distinct digital crime template.
The estimate W should be compared with unity. If W is sufficiently
close to unity, this signifies that the prima facie of the case can probably
4be established; otherwise, it is unlikely that the available digital traces
are sufficient to support the case.
In other words, the differential gap between W and unity can formu-
late a ”cut-off” condition that can avoid identifying all traces exhaus-
tively in a forensics investigation. This ”cut-off” state can be illustrated
by the following example. Suppose in an investigation where email ex-
changes between the culprit and the victim are essential. The forensic
focus is therefore to confirm the computer, which was under the culprit’s
control at the material times, had been used to send and receive the ma-
terial emails. Assume the evidential traces for the above premise are
T1, T2, T3, T4, and T5 with evidential weights of 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.2,
and 0.35 respectively. Now, suppose the calculated evidential thresh-
old value is 0.85. Therefore, if all the traces are found and identified,
then the estimated total evidential weight is 0.85, which means a strong
case. On the other hand, if trace T1 was not found the overall evidential
weight will be 0.8, indicating 6% fall-off. If both T1 and T2 were miss-
ing, then the overall evidential weight will be 0.7, denoting 18% fall-off.
Now, forensic investigators of this case should consider suspending the
examination as the prospect of a successful prosecution is slim.
3. Missing Traces
Given sufficiently large storage may not be available in every com-
puter, there exists the chance that some of the traces are missing or
overwritten. In other words, there is no way that an examiner can fully
ascertain the trace evidence of the case. Suppose that a single trace Tj
(1 ≤ j ≤ m) is not found. All investigative paths involving Tj must
be deleted from the path diagram and the minimum cost path becomes
[T1T2. . .Tj−1Tj+1 . . .Tm−1Tm]. The estimate of the evidential weight
is given by W=
∑m
i 6=jwi.
Similarly, if any two traces, Tj and Tk (1 ≤ j; k ≤m; j ≤ k) are not
found then all investigative paths involvingTj orTk must be deleted and
the minimum cost path is [T1T2 . . .Tj−1Tj+1 . . .Tk−1Tk+1 . . .Tm−1Tm];
the estimate of the evidential weight isW=
∑m
i6=j,kwi. More generally, if
a total of any k traces are not found (1 ≤ k <m), then all investigative
paths containing any of these k traces must be deleted from the path
diagram.
We consider here briefly the issue of the independence of the digital
traces Ti. While the observations of the traces are necessarily indepen-
dent because they are performed individually post mortem, it should be
noted that the digital traces must also be created independently if the
model is to retain its validity. Since it is possible in principle for one
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user action A to result in the creation of multiple digital traces Ti which
are consequently not mutually independent, care must be taken when
selecting the set of expected digital traces to ensure their independence.
4. The Schema
We can now set out a two-phase schema for performing a minimum
cost path digital forensic examination as follows: Phase 1 (pre-processing
- detecting the traces):
Enumerate the set of traces that are expected to be present in
the seized computer based on the type of computer crime that is
suspected of having been committed.
Assign relative investigation costs to each of the expected traces.
Rank the expected traces in order of increasing relative investiga-
tion costs.
Assign relative importance weights wi to each of the ranked traces.
Rank the expected traces within each cost band in order of de-
creasing relative importance weight.
Set W, the cumulative evidential weight estimate, equal to zero.
Set Wrem, the remaining total of available weights, to 1.
For each expected trace, taken in ranked order:
– Search for the expected trace.
– Subtract the relative importance weight wi of the expected
trace from Wrem.
– If the expected trace is present add its relative importance
weight wi to W.
– If W is sufficiently close to 1 then proceed immediately to
Phase 2.
– If (W+Wrem) is insufficiently close to 1 then abandon the
forensics investigation.
Phase 2 (Bayesian network - analyzing the traces):
Set up a full Bayesian Network model for the hypothesis of the
digital crime and run and analyze the Bayesian Network model for
the hypothesis of the digital crime as described previously in [3].
65. BitTorrent Example Case Study
In this section we use the BitTorrent (BT) example from our previ-
ous work to demonstrate how our proposed cost-effective digital forensics
investigation methodology can be applied in practice. The Bayesian Net-
work model diagram (1.5) is taken from Figure 5 of [3]. The 18 expected
evidences E in 1 are ranked by cost as the 18 expected traces T for the
ideal case in 1. The actual case, where two of the expected traces are in
fact missing, is similarly described in 2. A potential complication of our
proposed schema should be highlighted at this juncture. It is possible
that a trace which is initially assigned a low cost may subsequently be
discovered to entail a significantly cost. Typical examples would include
a file which turns out to be protected by encryption, or a partition which
turns out to be deleted, etc. In such cases, the cost of investigating that
trace must be revised and the traces must be re-ranked according to
the revised cost. This procedure is necessary in order to maintain the
minimum cost strategy for the investigation.
6. Analytic Assignment of Prior Probabilities
For any given type of digital crime, the Bayesian network model corre-
sponding to the investigation of that crime requires two kinds of input.
Firstly, the overall structure of the Bayesian network itself has to be
defined; this comprises the hierarchy of hypotheses and the associated
posterior digital evidence (or traces) whose presence or absence deter-
mines the prior probabilities of the corresponding hypothesis. Secondly,
numerical values have to be assigned to the prior probabilities. Tradi-
tionally, forensic examiners have assigned the prior probabilities semi-
quantitatively based on a consensus of past experience and professional
expertise. Recently, however, there have been a number of challenges
to the qualitative assessments of forensic examiners acting as expert
witnesses in judicial proceedings, primarily on the grounds that these
assessments are non-rigorous and/or subjective.
These challenges can be effectively countered if a rigorous analytic
procedure is developed to assign the prior probabilities quantitatively.
We propose here that the application of complexity theory in its various
manifestations [4] can be used to address this issue directly. Essentially,
every route by which each evidential trace could have been produced is
enumerated, and the probability associated with each route is evaluated
using the tools and techniques of complexity theory. We illustrate our
contention with an example from the BitTorrent (BT) case [3]: we eval-
uate the prior probability that hypothesis H2 is true given that trace
evidence E8 (i.e. T5) is found.
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Figure 2. Bayesian Network Model for the BT Case








Initial Values 0 1
T1(E6) Shared file exists on the hard
disk
1 2/18 2/18 16/18
T2(E1) Modification time of the desti-
nation file is after its own mod-
ification time
1 1/18 3/18 15/18
T3(E2) Creation time of the destination
file is after its own modification
time
1 1/18 4/18 14/18
T4(E3) Hash value of the destination
file matches that of the source
file
1 1/18 5/18 13/18
T5(E8) Torrent file exists on the hard
disk
1 1/18 6/18 12/18
T6(E16) Web browser software is found 1 1/18 7/18 11/18
T7(E5) File link for the shared file is cre-
ated
1 0.5/18 7.5/18 10.5/18
T8(E15) URL of the publishing website
is stored in the web browser
1 0.5/18 8/18 10/18
T9(E7) Torrent file creation record is
found
1.5 2/18 10/18 8/18
T10(E13) Internet connection is available 1.5 2/18 12/18 6/18
T11(E10) Tracker server login record is
found
1.5 0.5/18 12.5/18 5.5/18
T12(E12) Internet history record about
publishing website is found
1.5 0.5/18 13/18 5/18
T13(E14) Cookie of the publishing website
is found
1.5 0.5/18 13.5/18 4.5/18
T14(E17) Internet cache record about the
publishing of the torrent file is
found
1.5 0.5/18 14/18 4/18
T15(E18) Internet history record about
the tracker server connection is
found
1.5 0.5/18 14.5/18 3.5/18
T16(E4) BitTorrent client software is in-
stalled on the seized computer
2 2/18 16.5/18 1.5/18
T17(E11) Torrent file activation time is
corroborated by its MAC time
and link file
2 1/18 17.5/18 0.5/18
T18(E9) Peer connection information is
found
2 0.5/18 1 0
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Initial Values 0 1
T1(E6) Shared file exists on the hard
disk
1 2/18 2/18 16/18
T2(E1) Modification time of the desti-
nation file is after its own mod-
ification time
1 1/18 3/18 15/18
T3(E2) Creation time of the destination
file is after its own modification
time
1 1/18 4/18 14/18
T4(E3) Hash value of the destination
file matches that of the source
file
1 1/18 5/18 13/18
T5(E8) Torrent file exists on the hard
disk (missing)
1 1/18 5/18 12/18
T6(E16) Web browser software is found 1 1/18 6/18 11/18
T7(E5) File link for the shared file is cre-
ated
1 0.5/18 6.5/18 10.5/18
T8(E15) URL of the publishing website
is stored in the web browser
1 0.5/18 7/18 10/18
T9(E7) Torrent file creation record is
found
1.5 2/18 9/18 8/18
T10(E13) Internet connection is available 1.5 2/18 11/18 6/18
T11(E10) Tracker server login record is
found
1.5 0.5/18 11.5/18 5.5/18
T12(E12) Internet history record about
publishing website is found
1.5 0.5/18 12/18 5/18
T13(E14) Cookie of the publishing website
is found (missing)
1.5 0.5/18 12/18 4.5/18
T14(E17) Internet cache record about the
publishing of the torrent file is
found
1.5 0.5/18 12.5/18 4/18
T15(E18) Internet history record about
the tracker server connection is
found
1.5 0.5/18 13/18 3.5/18
T16(E4) BitTorrent client software is in-
stalled on the seized computer
2 2/18 15/18 1.5/18
T17(E11) Torrent file activation time is
corroborated by its MAC time
and link file
2 1/18 16/18 0.5/18
T18(E9) Peer connection information is
found
2 0.5/18 16.5/18 0
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Evidence E8 is that the torrent file is present on the hard disk of the
seized computer. The various scenarios resulting in the presence of the
torrent file are as follows:
it was placed there by a covert malware process (e.g. a Trojan
horse)
it was copied or downloaded there from some other source
it was created there from the pirated file
A state-of-the-art anti-malware scan would reveal the presence of a suit-
able vector Trojan with a probability of approximately 0.98 [5]; the
efficacy of heuristics and behaviour blocking against zero-day malware
attacks are the principal sources of uncertainty in this figure. A thor-
ough, careful inventory of local networked drives and portable storage
media would reveal the presence of any source copy of the torrent file
with a probability in excess of 0.95. A high-quality search engine would
detect the presence of any downloadable copy of the torrent file with a
similar probability [6]. As a result, the probability that the torrent file
was created in situ on the hard disc of the seized computer would be
assigned at least 0.88. Furthermore, it is also possible to derive error
bars for the assigned probabilities assuming that the errors are normally
distributed. In the present case we obtain 0.94± 0.06.
7. Summary and Conclusions
The proposed two-phase digital investigation methodology is intended
to achieve its twin goals of reliability and cost-effectiveness through the
use of what is essentially a pre-processing and pre-screening phase which
runs in parallel with the usual data collection phase, referred to here
collectively as Phase 1.
The cost ranking and importance weighting of the expected traces,
which only has to be undertaken once for all investigations of a similar
type, enables the lowest cost traces to be examined first. This means that
both ’best case’ and ’worst case’ scenarios can be efficiently processed.
The combined use of importance weights and ranked costs means that
an ultimately futile investigation may be detected early, using only low
cost traces, and abandoned. By the same token, an investigation which
will ultimately prove unsuccessful may be halted before the most high
cost traces are investigated.
The model will perform best in cases where the distribution of impor-
tance versus cost is skewed towards low cost, and worst in cases where
the distribution of importance versus cost is skewed towards high cost.
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In the average case, where this distribution is essentially unskewed, or
even uniform, the model will exhibit an intermediate performance. How-
ever, it should be noted that even in the most pathological cases, the
model’s performance should not be significantly worse than the current
exhaustive search or random search for traces.
One of the advantages of the model is that it offers the possibility of
creating templates of expected traces and their associated costs and im-
portance weights for each distinct type of digital crime. Taken together
with the systematic schema (section 4) for the investigation process, it
offers less experienced investigators a benchmark by which to calibrate
their own investigative procedures, while at the same time providing
trainee investigators with a system for adoption in its entirety.
Given the current worldwide under-resourcing by governments of pub-
lic sector law enforcement agencies, cost-effective utilization of scarce
resources is essential and our minimum cost path approach appears well-
matched to attaining this objective.
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